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This document is designed to help you specify an
electronic access control system. This has been considered a
minefield in the past by people more familiar with intruder alarms
and CCTV – but these days manufacturers strive to supply
“usable” products that require little, if any, training. Common
sense and this document are all you should need!
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Old-fashioned locks and keys leave much to be
desired in anything other than a domestic environment, because:
- Standard
keys are easily copied
- Each
person may require several keys
- Lost
and stolen keys represent a major security risk, requiring time
and money to solve
But with a modern electronic system these
problems are a thing of the past.
Electronic systems can provide additional
security by enforcing time rules, by raising an alarm in the event of
an unauthorised attempt to gain access, and by recording all access
movements, in and out, for analysis in the event of later discovery
of a security breach.
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If the customer’s basic requirements are
known, then the choice of system can be quickly narrowed down. Basic
questions regarding the number of doors people will usually indicate
a particular system type (see “Choosing a TDSi System”). Some
customers – if they have an understanding of access control
principles – will be able to assess their own risks and be quite
positive about what features they require, while others will require
guidance. The next section talks about site surveys and risk
assessment.
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There is one golden rule that must be followed,
otherwise we’d go mad:
THERE
IS NO SUCH THING AS TOTAL SECURITY
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Total security is something we can aspire to,
but most commercial organisations – as opposed to the government,
the military etc. – have to evaluate how much security is
appropriate to the risk, and this will inevitably involve placing a
limit on the budget. The best systems are the ones that reduce the
immediate risk while allowing for non-redundant expansion as needs
grow – not just the need for more doors and more people but also
the need for more security. Unfortunately, we do live in a time when
each year, the risk increases.
So a site survey will involve assessing where
and what are the highest risks, and establishing how the risk may be
reduced. This is exactly the same principle as for intruder alarms
– work on the principle of “dissuading” the potential violator
so that they go elsewhere.
The highest risk will be where there is a
combination of the following factors: an un-secured door, with no
people about on either side of the door, leading to an area
containing something of value.
How much control?
Once you have established which doors need to be
controlled, you have to establish how much control to apply. This is
rarely a case of “all-or-nothing” – where any person with a
card can gain access wherever and whenever they want – and so
it’s worth looking at the various enhancements to establish which
ones can be applied:
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Feature
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How it
works
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Where it
is of benefit
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Access
Levels
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Each person
can only go through certain doors.
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If some
areas in the organisation are felt to need higher protection
than others, for reasons of, for example, theft or
confidentiality. This is probably true for most organisations.
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Time Zones
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Each person
can only go through certain doors at certain times.
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If there are
times of day or days of the week when certain people should not
be present – for example, a business whose normal office hours
are 9-to-5 might wish to allow access only during the hours of 8
a.m. until 6 p.m.
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Card+PIN
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After using
a card, a person must type in a PIN before the door will open
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If there is
a risk of lost or stolen cards being used. This risk may be at
its highest when the number of people in the area is at its
lowest – in which case this feature can be scheduled
automatically.
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Anti
pass-back
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After a card
has been used to gain access to an area, it cannot be used again
for a given time (“timed anti pass-back”) or until the card
has been used to leave the area.
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Where there
is a risk of one person inside an area handing a card to someone
outside the area. The risk is higher where turnstiles are
installed, because ordinary doors allow “tail-gating”
anyway.
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Man traps
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A door will
not open unless another door is closed.
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Where there
is an “air-lock” situation – e.g. dust-free zones – or
where tailgating can be prevented by two doors close together
with room for only one person in between them.
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Alarms
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Any
“unexpected” event or “abnormal behaviour” can be
notified to a supervisor, who can then establish what happened
and decide how to respond.
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This can
benefit every installation. For example, if a door is left open
too long, or a person tries to gain access where they are not
allowed, then these represent risks that can and should be
eliminated. There are many different types of event that can be
detected and dealt with – too many to list here.
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Point-monitoring
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“Spare” inputs on the access control
system can be used to monitor windows, fire exits and the like.
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If there is a risk that open windows and
fire exits could allow people to by-pass the access control
system.
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All electronic access control systems work on
the bases of identifying a person before deciding whether to unlock
the door. The means of identification fall into three categories.
These are the least secure. Those with a common
code – where everyone uses the same number – are the cheapest and
least secure.
Slightly better are unique PIN systems, where
each person has a different number, and these do at least allow you
to delete a single code if it has become “compromised”. But there
is still the risk of deliberate or accidental passing on of a code,
and little way of knowing that this has happened.
This type of system is the most popular, and the
type that the remainder of this document focuses on.
Token based systems, using cards, tags etc.,
provide much better security. Each token is usually unique – or as
near to unique as makes no matter – and if you are concerned about
stolen tokens you can require a PIN number in the way that cash
machines do.
The choice of card technology can seem
bewildering at first, but each technology has its own set of unique
characteristics and pricing structure. Fundamentally, there are two
types – those that you have to insert or swipe, and those where the
card is read at a distance. The latter kind are mostly short range
(i.e. proximity) working from 2cm up to 60cm. But there are true
hands-free systems where 1 or 2 meter range is quite possible and you
don’t need to get the card out of your pocket as you approach the
door.
After several years in existence, biometric
systems are only now starting to find acceptance in the general, as
opposed to specialised, security market. Fingerprint recognition
seems to be the most popular at the moment in terms of cost, accuracy
and acceptability. But facial recognition is a technique that has
been proven and when the price/performance ratio starts to improve we
can expect to see significant market change in favour of such
systems. Iris recognition is being trialled by some banks for
increasing security at ATMs.
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This is what the person carries in order to
identify himself or herself to the system. It may be
credit-card-sized, or it may be more like a fob on a key-ring. It may
have to be “swiped” through a slot in the reader or merely
brought to within a few centimetres (“proximity”). Some work from
a metre away and don’t even need to be removed from the pocket
(“hands-free”).
If there is no pre-existing reason for choosing
one technology over another (e.g. if the cards have to also be used
in an other system such as a time-and-attendance recorder) then the
choice of technology will be based on cost of readers, cost of cards,
level of security offered and personal preference:
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Technology
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Reader cost
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Card Cost
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Security* |
Other issues
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Mag-stripe
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Low
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Low
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Low
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Mis-reads are common. Readers are usually
not weatherproof. Cards are easily damaged through accidentally
erasure of the coding.
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Wiegand
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Medium
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Medium
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Medium
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Old technology; often site-specific so long
lead-times at manufacture
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Infra-red (Microcard)
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Medium
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Medium
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Medium
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Small readers, mis-reads are rare. Cards
are more secure and more robust than mag-stripe.
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Proximity
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High
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Medium to High
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High
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Easy to use and rapidly growing in
popularity as prices come down. Most cards are “passive”
(i.e. contain no battery) and therefore have an unlimited life.
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Hands-free
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High
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High
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High
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Can read when you don’t want them to;
e.g. walking down corridors past doors. Most cards are
“active” (i.e. contain a battery) and therefore have a
limited life.
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Smart Card (e.g. Mifare)
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High
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High
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High
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Can be useful where several different
systems are installed and only one card per person is wanted.
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* Card security – the risk of copying - is
not a single issue. It relates to the need for time, equipment,
money, and special material. It also relates to the risk of the
copying being detected.
This is what identifies the person to the
controller, by reading the card and sending its unique identity.
Some readers are more prone to vandalism than
others, so risk-assessment needs to be carried out. If a reader is
attacked, it may result in unauthorised access (see “intelligent
readers”) but usually will result in authorised people being denied
access. Some proximity readers can be hidden behind panels so that
being invisible better protects them.
Two readers may be required on some
installations – either to enforce anti pass-back rules or to
monitor everyone’s whereabouts. But this only works if turnstiles
are used…
The choice of lock depends firstly on the door
– electric strikes or bolts, magnetic locks, turnstiles or barriers
are all options depending firstly on the architecture
– and secondly on the required resistance to attack.
As the “lock” is normally located on the
edge of the door furthest from the hinge, double-doors represent a
particular problem unless one door is fixed closed during normal
operation (i.e. it is normally opened only for emergencies or to
allow large objects to pass through).
Another problem situation is a door that
“swings” – i.e. opens both inwards and outwards so it can be
pushed open from either side. Frameless glass doors also require
specialist solutions.
All lock types have their advantages and
disadvantages – if you are unsure which type to choose then gather
as much information as possible about the door and seek advice from a
supplier.
Magnetic locks have become very popular as they
provide rapid solutions in a wide variety of circumstances – often
without the need for major surgery to the door, frame or pre-existing
“furniture”.
There are two types: face-to-face for outward
opening doors and shearlocks for inward opening and swing doors.
These locks are available in a range of strengths and designs. Note
that some designs will reduce “headroom” and may have
health-and-safety implications if there is a risk of injury from the
metal edges of the mechanism.
The door sensor is an optional piece of
equipment, which serves two purposes:
- For
access control, the door sensor provides an extra level of
security, in the following way. If the lock release time is set
to, say, 10 seconds, it is quite possible for someone to get
through the door in only two or three seconds after using their
card. This leaves seven or eight seconds of 'un–expired' time,
during which (if no door sensor was fitted) the door could still
be opened. However, if a door sensor is fitted, then as soon as
the door opens the lock release is de–energised. The door
re–locks as it closes.
- For
access monitoring, having a door sensor fitted means that all
occurrences of the door opening and closing can be monitored if a
printer or PC is part of the installation. Also, relays can be set
to operate – and thereby sound an alarm – if a door opens when
it shouldn't (i.e. the access control system had not released the
lock), or stays open for too long.
This is an optional piece of equipment, which
allows people through a door – from the secure area to a less
secure area – without the use of a card or PIN. Pushing the button
causes the lock to be released, just as if a card had been entered
(i.e. for the pre–programmed 'lock release time').
This is sometimes used as a 'reception' button,
where someone inside the building can let someone else in.
More commonly, the egress button permits a
person to exit the building or room. Although certain types of door
lock mechanisms permit egress by turning the handle on the inside,
this may be detected by the ACU as a 'door forced' situation. In
other words, the door has opened but no card or PIN was used.
Installing an egress button gets round this problem.
Note that fire regulations may also require
people to be able to exit an area without depending in any way on
electrical systems.
An access control system is useless if the door
is propped open. If a door sensor is fitted, then a sounder can be
used to alert anyone in the vicinity that this has happened. Loud
buzzers are very effective at persuading people not to do this in the
first place!
Controllers may be built-in to a reader or be
separate. Separate controllers may control one door or several. See
“types of system” later for guidance on how to choose which is
best.
Software provides a means of programming cards
and setting the rules for the system – normally this information is
sent to the controllers so that it is the controller(s) that makes
the decisions. These rules are also stored in a database on the
computer so that (a) you can see what you have programmed and (b) if
a failed controller has to be replaced then it can be re-loaded with
the necessary information.
Software will normally also monitor the system,
recording events (e.g. who has gone through which door and when) and
saving the information to disk so that reports can be printed.
Normally, you will be able to view these events in “real-time” so
that you can watch as people move around.
You cannot buy access control software from one
manufacturer and use it with controllers and readers from another
manufacturer.
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It’s worth looking briefly at the types of
systems that exist.
At the simplest level, a combined
reader/controller provides a convenient all-in-one package that can
be installed quickly to control access at a single door. You could
install more than one if you have more than one door, but then every
time you needed to add or erase a user, you would have to do this at
several locations.
There is a security risk with these products, in
that the controlling electronics is on the insecure side of the door,
and therefore open to attack. Consideration needs to be given to the
likelihood of attack, and if the risk is high then either some form
of tamper protection will need to be fitted or a different type of
system installed.
When protecting a single door, fitting a
controller on the secure side of the door is more secure in high-risk
situations. No matter how the reader is attacked, the door will not
open.
For multiple door situations, there are
controllers that can control several doors each. This can represent
cost savings because there is only one controller, and it can also be
more convenient because you can programme cards in for multiple doors
with a single action. But the practicalities and costs of cabling up
between the doors can outweigh the benefits depending on the cabling
distances.
Intelligent readers and separate controllers
fall into the category of “stand-alone” systems because they do
not need a computer and software to mange and monitor them. Computer
linked systems should be considered where any of the following apply:
- more
than one stand-alone system would have to be installed to secure
the number of doors required (in such cases you would otherwise
have to perform programming operations at multiple locations)
- there
are more than just a couple of different combinations of access
rights (imagine the complexity of programming a 16-door
stand-alone system where some people are allowed through all
doors, some through some of the doors, others through a different
selection of doors…)
- more
than one person can be expected to administer different aspects of
the system (multiple workstations make this easy and convenient)
- a
remote site needs to be controlled and monitored (either dial-up
modems or a permanent network connection can be utilised)
Such systems provide the ultimate in convenience
and flexibility, and healthy competition ensures high performance at
sensible prices. Modern systems are intuitive and user-friendly and
require minimal training for administrators.
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Type of system
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Pros
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Cons
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Intelligent reader
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Low cost, easy installation
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System is on the “insecure” side of the
door and can be attacked to gain unauthorised access.
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One-door controller
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More secure than intelligent readers in
vulnerable locations.
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If more than one door is to be controlled,
cards will have to be programmed in each controller.
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Multi-door controller
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Single point of programming up to the
capacity of the controller (2-16 doors typically)
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Sophisticated features can complex to set
up.
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Networked system
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Central programming and monitoring
regardless of number of doors.
User-interface much more intuitive and
flexible.
Multiple workstations can administer the
system.
Sophisticated filtered reporting, alarm
management, interface with other systems.
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None (except cost!).
Note that a small minority of
computer-linked systems use the computer to make the decisions
– this may mean a computer failure means failure of the whole
system.
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People don’t want to get out of their cars so
that they can use their card to raise the barrier – this is an
ideal situation for mid-range proximity readers. Up to 60 cm can be
achieved with “passive” tags and if this is acceptable it means
that the readers used in the building may well be cheaper than if
active tags were used.
If a car park cannot hold all the cars that
might want to use it, then some form of occupancy control needs to be
implemented. This can sometimes be part of the barrier system, where
a counter can be reset when the car park is empty, and from then on
counts all the cars in and all the cars out. The barrier will not be
raised if the counter is above a set limit. This form of control can
also be applied by the access control unit, which counts cards rather
than cars and can be cheaper to implement as it may reduce the need
for vehicle loops.
Several systems offer the possibility of
elevator control. Typically, this involves placing a reader in the
elevator car and when a card is presented, only the floors to which
that card is allowed can be accessed. This is achieved by re-wiring
the floor call-buttons through relays in the ACU. When a card is
used, the appropriate relays change over and for the next few seconds
the call-buttons may be pressed. Some more modern elevators allow the
relays to be wired into a command interface instead of having to
re-wire the call buttons. In high-rise elevators (30 floors and over)
there sometimes a data interface through which commands may be sent
to enable and disable call-buttons.
Remote sites can be considered as being of two
types – those where local administration and monitoring is
required, and those where it is not.
If local administration is required, then
usually the two sites will be have to be linked together by a
permanent-available connection – for example a Wide Ara Network
(WAN). This is because in any system there is usually only one
database – and any administration terminal must be linked to the
database.
If local administration is not required then an
occasional connection may be implemented – for example, dial-up
modem over conventional telephone lines. The central computer will
connect to the remote site whenever there are commands and card
numbers to be sent, and will also connect on a regular basis to
collect event data. The access control units on the remote site will
connect to the PC whenever there is an alarm to report.
An access control system can generate a huge
amount of event data that may be useful in analysing what happened
after an incident has occurred. However, nobody is likely to want to
sit in front of a screen watching this happen in “real time”.
This is where alarm management comes in – this is the principle of
notifying someone only as and when a specified event occurs.
The general principles of good alarm management
systems can be summed up as follows:
- it
must be hard to miss the fact that an alarm has been raised
- it
must be easy to establish what the event was, and where it
happened
- if
there is more than one alarm, it must be easy to establish which
is the more important one (importance is pre-defined by the system
administrator)
- the
operator must be able to find out what he or she is supposed to do
about the alarm
- the
system administrator must be able to find out what alarms have
occurred, which operators dealt with them and how quickly they did
so.
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Even trusted employees should be controlled.
Essentially, by giving them a card you are saying, “I trust you”.
But even if you have thoroughly vetted all your staff, and have done
psychological profiling to establish trustworthiness, circumstances
change.
So, by restricting access only to those areas
and only during those times decided by the system administrator
decided, the risk is minimised. Also, if someone has been told
exactly where they can and can’t go, and they try to “bend the
rules” by trying their card in a prohibited area – or if someone
has stolen their card and is trying gain unauthorised entry because
they don’t know where that card is allowed – the system can make
the most almighty row about it!
Anti pass-back also prevents a dishonest
employee from gaining access through a turnstile and then passing
their card through the bars to someone else.
And if you don’t discover until much later
that a security breach has occurred – the event log will show you
all events from the system – doors opening, closing, being left
open too long, fire doors propped open. It may well be that the
monitoring is as useful as control in providing deterrence.
Not all electronic systems provide these
additional features and they naturally have a price attached –
it’s up to the customer to decide if they are important.
Un-attended visitors should be treated in the
same way as employees, with one extra consideration – if a visitor
does not return his or her card then it should be voided. Some
systems can do this automatically.
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Integration with other security systems –
particularly CCTV – is becoming a common requirement. In an
unattended situation, rather than having the CCTV system switch
through the cameras on a programmed sequence, it is possible for the
access control system to react to an unusual event occurs by sending
a command so that pictures are recorded of the location of the event
for later analysis.
Another possibility is for high-security
low-traffic situations, for example late at night, where you might
want a guard to decide whether to allow access or not. If the guard
is not close to the point of access, which is quite possible where
more than one point of access exists, then when a user swipes their
card, the system can:
- alert
the guard that someone wants to gain access
- bring
up a picture stored in the access control database of the true
owner of the card
- switch
a CCTV camera so the guard can see the live picture of the person
standing there
The guard can check that the two images match,
and release the door by simple command to the access control system.
This need take no more than a few seconds – and the guard might be
many miles from the door!
Where guards provide security, they may well be
responsible for dealing with alarms generated by the access control
system. If they are on tour round the site, they could be alerted by
a message sent to their pager or mobile phone. Also, while on tour,
if they fail to use their card at a certain point by a certain time,
the system could raise another alarm to summon help in case they have
been attacked.
Intruder alarms are normally active
out-of-hours, while the access control system is mainly used during
work hours. However, at the point where these two overlap – e.g.
first person in and last person out – the access control system can
over-ride the intruder system by shunting intruder detection contacts
or arming or disarming the system. Also, if a security incident
occurs, comparing event logs from the two systems can provide useful
evidence.
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The limitations and economics of running cables
needs to be considered:
- Reader
cables have limitations due to signal degradation over distance.
Typically, 100 metres is the limit – but it may be less
depending on the reader technology, the specification of the
controller and also the amount of electrical noise in the
vicinity.
- Low-capacitance
cable will normally be required for reader and communications
cables.
- Lock-strike
cables have limitations due to voltage drop. Simple calculations
will tell you what specification of cable to use.
- All
cables should be screened, with separate “functions” carried
down separate cables. Sometimes you might get away without using
following these rules – but if the installation doesn’t work
reliably you’ll need to re-cable, and this may be costly in
man-hours!
- Typical
requirements per-door are:
6-core cable for Reader
2-core cable for Door Sense
2-core cable for Lock Strike
2-core cable for Egress Button
2-core cable for Door Ajar sounder
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There are many ways in which an access control
system can benefit an organisation.
Security can be further enhanced if the access
control card also bears a picture of the rightful holder. If staff
members are instructed to challenge anyone not wearing a card, or if
the picture doesn’t match the face, then every employee suddenly
becomes an additional security guard.
Because the system can record all comings and
goings, the data can be used for other purposes. For example,
calculation of the time spent on the premises can be used for
attendance totals, and this in turn can satisfy the requirements of
the working time directive or be used for payroll. Further, in the
event of a fire alarm or other catastrophe, the system can list all
those people on the premises and also those who have presented
themselves at muster points. Beware though – this does require
significant enforcement of rules requiring every person to swipe in
as well as out even if someone holds the door open for him or her.
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In closing, let us remember one vital thing:
Don’t forget the people who have to use the
system. If the system makes it hard for them to do their job – in
particular through queuing to get through turnstiles, or being
refused access where they should have been allowed - eventually it
may have to be de-commissioned or significantly revised. Fortunately,
many of the aspects we have covered are of benefit to the employees
as well as the employer, and problems like this are rare.
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